So, here's an interesting question posed to my Environmental Policy class, and then my answer:
Discussing the susceptibility of the public to misleading narratives / metaphors is a tricky question. Clearly, this presupposes that we, as the objective observer, are able to discern truth from fiction. More frequently, we are not objective observers, but instead have an agenda. Therefore, we will disagree with those political narratives that incite opposition to our stated policy agenda. In other words, given our frame of reference, we will label narratives “misleading” by the degree to which we disagree with them. Further, we can assume that (at the outset of the debate) there are some people who will oppose our agenda, and therefore call our narratives misleading.
The initial question, then, could be re-stated: “to what extent are those who have no initial strong feelings about a policy or agenda more susceptible to misleading narratives?” Rabin (1998) discusses this question at length. An individual’s decision-making is often influenced by their point of reference – most notably if a debate or policy question can be framed in terms of loss or gain. Rabin’s research showed that, as a rule, individuals are significantly less willing to gamble on a loss than they are on a gain. (Essentially, if I offered a person $50 now, or a ticket in a lottery with a 50% chance of getting $100 or 50% chance of getting zero, they would more likely take the lottery. Conversely, if I gave a person $100, and then asked if they would rather lose $50 for sure, or take a lottery with 50% chance they lose it all, and 50% chance they lose nothing, they will more likely take the guaranteed $50 loss.) If a new policy is a gamble and existing policy a guarantee, then the political implications are evident.
As we demonstrated in class discussion, environmental regulation is easily framed in terms of losses and gains, dependent upon a political agenda. Environmentalists can couch their argument in terms of “increasing air quality” or “decreasing rainfall”, while their opponents might discuss “losing freedoms” or “paying more taxes”. The public’s susceptibility to debate framing (or what one side might call a “misleading narrative”) is dependent upon one party’s ability to successfully appeal to the public’s preferences.
Debate framing is not, however, a foolproof political strategy. Significant behavioral research has demonstrated that, given sufficient information and interest, the public will re-frame the debate for themselves (individually) and make a rational decision – based upon their unique set of preferences. The key weakness in the “flood them with information” strategy, however, is generating sufficient interest. Public interest, in general, depends upon a perceived threat, which can be easily framed by politically motivated parties. It is this logic loop that contributes, in part, to Lindblom's theory of incrementalism, and Baumgartner’s punctuated policy equilibrium. Large policy changes occur within an environment of "crisis" or (less severely) "elevated threat" - when the public or policy makers feel their interests are in danger. These moments - in theory - generate sufficient interest for the public to seek greater information.
Clearly, there are many instances in our public discourse where this is not the case - where elevated threat seems to incite only elevated rhetoric. I would argue, however, that increased public anxiety and political discourse indicate the higher stakes associated with a policy window - an opportunity to make large changes to the policy landscape. And, to return to Lindblom / Baumgartner, this policy window exists because the public perceives a greater threat to their interests.
Therefore, policy makers and interest groups have great incentive to use narratives to influence the agenda. Their incentive, however, is not necessarily to educate the public, but rather increase the perceived threat level, and thereby force open the policy window for more significant change.
Posts
